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The Ramifications of Rejecting Wrongful
Birth: A Closer Look at Grubbs v.
Barbourville Family Health Center
BY JOHANNA L. FRANTZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 21, 2003, the Kentucky Supreme Court handed down
controversial decision in Grubbs v. Barbourville Family
Health Center.' The court held, with two justices dissenting in part, that
"birth-related torts," specifically wrongful life and wrongful birth
claims, have no place in Kentucky jurisprudence.2 While the court's
stance on wrongful life mirrors that of most jurisdictions in the United
States, its position on wrongful birth is woefully out of sync.
Part II of this note provides background on the concepts of wrongful
birth and wrongful life, including significant decisions in both areas.3
Since the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision regarding wrongful life
matches that of most other jurisdictions, the note primarily focuses on
wrongful birth. Initially, Part II outlines the elements of a successful
wrongful birth claim.4 Part III delves deeper into the Grubbs decision,
including the story behind the case, the majority opinion, and a
comparison of the supreme court's reasoning with the wrongful birth
jurisprudence of other jurisdictions.5 Part IV discusses the primary flaws
in the majority's decision and what the court could have done to provide
adequate relief.
6
* J.D. expected 2005, University of Kentucky. I would like to thank Professor Mary
Davis for her assistance in formulating the framework of this note; special thanks also to
my fianc6, Matt Ellison, and to my parents, Bruce and Vicki Frantz, for their constant
love and support.
Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Ctr., 120 S.W.3d 682 (Ky. 2003).
2 Charles Wolfe, High Court Rejects 'Wrongful Life' Suits, COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville), Aug. 22, 2004, at B4.
3 See infra notes 6-77 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 78-128 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 129-188 and accompanying text.
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II. WRONGFUL LIFE AND WRONGFUL BIRTH: FROM INFANCY TO
ADULTHOOD
The birth-related tort debate is relatively new to Kentucky; thus, it is
useful to examine the origin and evolution of the issues. But first, it is
important to understand the difference between the terms "wrongful
birth" and "wrongful life," as they have often been misused and
confused.7
Wrongful life and wrongful birth can easily be distinguished by the
identity of the plaintiff in the suit. Courts consistently define a "wrongful
life action" as one brought by the child against a physician, alleging that
the physician's negligence "deprived the child's parents of the decision
to abort or never conceive."8 Basically, the child claims that he or she
should never have been born. On the other hand, the parents, not the
child, are the plaintiffs in wrongful birth claims.9 These suits typically
allege that the physician has either "misread the findings of a genetic test
or otherwise failed to determine that a fetus has a genetic defect."' 0 A
child born as a result of such negligence is typically not a normal,
healthy child." The parties in both types of claims seek damages ranging
from the entire cost of rearing and caring for the child,12 to emotional
pain and suffering, 3 to only the additional costs of caring for a severely
7 See Michele E. Beasley, Wrongful Birth/Wrongful Life: The Tort Progeny of
Legalized Abortion, in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW 233 (J. Douglas Butler &
David F. Walbert eds., 1992).
81d. at 234.
9 Thomas A. Bums, Note, When Life is an Injury: An Economic Approach to
Wrongful Life Lawsuits, 52 DuKE L.J. 807, 807 (2003) ("Wrongful birth lawsuits are
prenatal negligence suits brought by the parents of a deformed or retarded child against a
doctor who negligently failed to diagnose or inform the parents about potential birth
defects.").
10 William Young, Wrongful Birth and Life Suits Hit Med-Mal Nerve, 12 NEW
JERSEY LAWYER: THE WEEKLY NEWSPAPER, April 28, 2003, at 17; see also Bums, supra
note 9, at 807.
1 Actions stemming from the birth of healthy, unwanted children due to a
physician's negligence (e.g., from his failure to perform a sterilization procedure
correctly, see Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 488 (Wash. 1983)) are called
"wrongful conception" or "wrongful pregnancy" actions. See, e.g., Phillips v. United
States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 545 n.1 (D.S.C. 1981). This type of action has been recognized
in at least 12 states. Beasley, supra note 7, at 234.
12 See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 473 (7th Cir. 1981) (seeking
expenses for the "care, education, and maintenance" of the impaired child).
13 See, e.g., Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Colo. 1988) (seeking
"general damages for emotional distress and pain and suffering"); Bader v. Johnson, 732
N.E.2d 1212, 1220 (Ind. 2000) (seeking, inter alia, damages for "mental and emotional
anguish"); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 348 (N.H. 1986) (seeking damages for
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handicapped child, which are above and beyond those of raising a
normal, healthy child.14 This vast range of possible damage awards fuels
the controversy surrounding this emotional area of tort law.'5
A. Wrongful Life
Zepeda v. Zepeda16 introduced the contentious concept of wrongful
life. After serious discussion, the court decided that the plaintiff:
[P]rotests not only the act which caused him to be born but birth itself.
Love of life being what it is, one may conjecture whether, if he were
older, he would feel the same way. . . . Be that as it may, the
quintessence of his complaint is that he was born and that he is.' 7
The court believed this argument was both dangerous and unacceptable
for two reasons: 1) there might be no end to such litigation if the court
opened the floodgates, 8 and 2) creating this new cause of action is best
left to the legislature.' 9 As a result, the court refused to recognize this
first presentation of wrongful life as a viable cause of action in tort. °
"emotional distress, anxiety and trauma"); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 809
(N.Y. 1978) (seeking damages for emotional distress due to the birth of the child).
14 See, e.g., Lininger, 764 P.2d at 1204 (seeking "special damages for doctors,
nurses, hospitals, and special education for the impaired child"); Bader, 732 N.E.2d at
1220 (seeking damages for "(1) the extraordinary costs necessary to treat the birth defect,
(2) only additional medical or educational costs attributable to the birth defect during the
child's minority, [and] (3) medical and hospital expenses incurred as a result of the
physician's negligence"); Cote, 513 A.2d at 348 (seeking "compensation for the
extraordinary medical and educational costs" necessary to raise the child); Jacobs v.
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. 1975) (seeking "medical and hospital expenses"
incurred during the deformed child's life).
'5 It is this broad range of damages sought and inconsistently awarded that has
created the most debate about whether these claims should be allowed at all. See
discussion infra Part IV.B.
16 Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849, 851 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963) (involving an infant
son, born illegitimately, who sued his father for not marrying his mother, claiming
"damages for the deprivation of his right to be a legitimate child").
17 Id. at 857, reprinted in Beasley, supra note 7, at 236.
IS Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d at 858 ("One might seek damages for being born of a certain
color, another because of race; one for being born with a hereditary disease, another for
inheriting unfortunate family characteristics; one for being born into a large and destitute
family, another because a parent has an unsavory reputation.").




The next case in this lineage added new wrinkles to the argument.
Gleitman v. Cosgrove,21 decided prior to Roe v. Wade,22 was the first
case to relate wrongful life to the parents' option of abortion. 3 The "core
issue of the child's claim"'24 was that "the conduct of [physicians]
prevented his mother from obtaining an abortion which would have
terminated his existence, and that his very life [was] 'wrongful.' 25 That
is, "in the language of tort he says: but for the negligence of defendants,
he would not have been born to suffer with an impaired body. 26 While
recognizing that the infant had a right to bring prenatal torts, 27 the
justices still rejected the wrongful life claim because the child could not
prove that the defendant doctors had caused his injury, and because they
deemed it "logically impossible" to calculate damages. 28 To do so would
require weighing the plaintiffs life with birth defects against the "utter
void of non-existence"; 29 that is, placing a dollar value on the difference
between an impaired life and no life at all. This the court was unwilling
(and quite possibly unable) to do.
Analysis of wrongful life actions matured greatly in the late 1970s.
The most oft-quoted case in wrongful life jurisprudence, Becker v.
Schwartz, was decided by the Court of Appeals of New York in 1978.30
Dolores Becker, age 37, became pregnant and was under the care of the
defendant gynecologists until her child was born. 31 Tragically, the child
32was born with Down's Syndrome. In their complaint, the Beckers
alleged that they were never informed of "the increased risk of Down's
Syndrome in children born to women over 35 years of age," nor were
21 Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967), abrogated by Berman v. Allan,
404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979).
22 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23 Beasley, supra note 7, at 237. Gleitman was also the "first traditional wrongful
life and wrongful birth lawsuit." Bums, supra note 9, at 813.
24 Beasley, supra note 7, at 237.
25 Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 692. This abortion connection would become extremely
important to wrongful birth jurisprudence after Roe. See infra Part II.B.
26 Id.
27 Id. "And regardless of analogies to other areas of the law, justice requires that the
principle be recognized that a child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and
body." (quoting Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (N.J. 1960)). Id.
28 See id. The court also stated that "no comparison is possible since were it not for
the act of birth the infant would not exist. By his cause of action, the plaintiff cuts from
under himself the ground upon which he needs to rely in order to prove his damage."
(citation omitted).
29 Id. Thomas Bums describes this problem as the "nonexistence paradox." See
Bums, supra note 9, at 814, 821.
30 Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).




they informed of the ability to detect the syndrome through a simple
amniocentesis test.33 They sought damages for wrongful life and
wrongful birth34 to cover the cost of institutional care for their child,
claiming that if they had received the benefit of the amniocentesis test
35and its results, they would have chosen to terminate the pregnancy.
The Becker court appears to have been very uncomfortable with this
argument, noting that "seeking compensation for the wrongful causation
of life itself casts an almost Orwellian shadow, premised as it is upon the
concepts of genetic predictability .... It borders on the absurdly obvious
to observe that resolution of this question transcends the mechanical
application of legal principles., 36 The court went on to adopt a sanctity-
of-life argument,37 concluding that wrongful life was "a Hobson's choice
[between] life in an impaired state and nonexistence," a decision that
"the law is not equipped to make.938 The court also noted that the
infants' wrongful life claims 39 "failed to state legally cognizable causes
of action," 40 in large part because there was "no precedent for
recognition... of 'the fundamental right of a child to be bom as a whole,
functional human being.''
33 a
34 The discussion in this section is confined to the outcome of the wrongful life
claim; see infra Part II.B for a discussion of Becker's wrongful birth claim.
35 Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 810.
36 id.
37 Id. at 812. The opinion stated:
Whether it is better never to have been born at all than to have been born with
even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly to be left to the philosophers
and the theologians. Surely the law can assert no competence to resolve the
issue, particularly in view of the very nearly uniform high value which the law
and mankind has placed on human life, rather than its absence. Not only is
there to be found no predicate at common law or in statutory enactment for
judicial recognition of the birth of a defective child as an injury to the child; the
implications of any such proposition are staggering.
Id. 38 id.
39 Becker was a consolidated appeal of two cases: Becker v. Schwartz, 400 N.Y.S.2d
419 (App. Div. 1977) (claiming damages for "wrongful life" on behalf of the infant in
addition to the parents' claims), and Park v. Chessin, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (App. Div. 1977)
(seeking damages for "wrongful life" on behalf of the infant as well as the parents'
claims for expenses for the care of the child, the emotional and physical suffering of the
mother, the emotional injuries of the father, and a claim by the infant's estate for
wrongful death). Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 809.
40 Id. at 811 (citation omitted).
41 Id. at 812.
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In 1979, a year after Becker, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
reconsidered Gleitman in Berman v. Allan.42 Once again rejecting the
plaintiffs' wrongful life claim, the Berman court "abandoned Gleitman 's
difficulty-of-measuring-damages rationale" in favor of adopting the
sanctity-of-life reasoning formulated by the Becker court.43 This
argument constitutes the backbone of nearly all rejections of wrongful
life claims today, including the Grubbs decisionthat is the subject of this
note.44
Currently, only three states "clearly recognize" wrongful life as a
valid cause of action,45 while twenty-six others expressly forbid it either
by statute or under common law.46 The states that do permit wrongful life
actions seem to view the impaired life versus nonexistence argument as
immaterial because "a plaintiff both exists and suffers, due to the
negligence of others."47 Their view is that the plaintiff, however
defective, has rights by virtue of being alive and therefore should be
allowed to recover damages.4
B. Wrongful Birth
Wrongful birth jurisprudence originated from the same roots as
wrongful life, but matured in a more abbreviated fashion. Gleitman,4 9 in
addition to setting the tone for wrongful life claims, also "marked the
first appearance and rejection of a wrongful birth claim by a set of
parents." 50 Mrs. Gleitman informed her physician that she had rubella
(German measles), and her physician negligently informed her that the
42 Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979).
43 Burns, supra note 9, at 816-17.
44 See Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022, 1025-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 696 (Ill. 1987); Goldberg v. Ruskin,
471 N.E.2d 530, 534 (I11. App. Ct. 1984); Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Ctr., 120
S.W.3d 682, 689 (Ky. 2003); Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 348 (Nev. 1995);
Berman, 404 A.2d at 12.
45 Beasley, supra note 7, at 234 n. 14; see also Young, supra note 10. The states that
allow wrongful life claims are California (Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 966 (Cal.
1982)), New Jersey (Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 764 (N.J. 1984)), and Washington
(Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 496 (Wash. 1983)).46 For a list of these states see Beasley, supra note 7, at 235 & nn. 17-18.
47 Burns, supra note 9, at 817 (quoting Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal.
Rptr. 477, 488 (Ct. App. 1980)).
48 See Bums, supra note 9, at 817 (quoting Curlender, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488).
49 See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967), abrogated by Berman v.
Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979).
50 Beasley, supra note 7, at 240.
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disease would have no effect on her unborn child.51 As a result of this
incorrect advice, Jeffrey Gleitman was born deaf and blind. 52 Mrs.
Gleitman claimed that she would have aborted her pregnancy if she had
been informed of this possibility.53 The New Jersey Supreme Court was
unswayed by Mrs. Gleitman's "missed abortion opportunity" argument,
concluding that "substantial policy reasons prevent this Court from
allowing tort damages for the denial of the opportunity to take an
embryonic life."54
Following Gleitman, wrongful birth claims seemed to be put on hold
for awhile: "no other [wrongful birth claims] were brought until after
Roe v. Wade was decided in 1973."55 Roe was not only a watershed case
for abortion rights; it provided a stronger foundation for wrongful birth
claims as well.56 As a result of Roe and subsequent cases, it became
easier for courts to give credence to the "lost abortion opportunity"
argument since the ability to obtain an abortion prior to viability, for any
reason, had become a legally cognizable right.57
Five years after Roe, Becker 58 became the first case to recognize
wrongful birth officially as a viable cause of action. The court,
recognizing the mother's right to an abortion, analyzed the problem
according to traditional negligence principles.59 The court assumed
arguendo that duty, breach, and causation had been shown, and instead
focused on the issue of damages, 60 concluding that it "require[d] nothing
extraordinary 61 to calculate damages for the plaintiff parents since the
conundrum of impaired existence versus nonexistence was not present.
"' Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 690.
52 id.
" Id. at 691.
14 Id. at 693.
55 Beasley, supra note 7, at 240 (citations omitted). While claims followed in 1975
(see, e.g., Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's
Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975)), most wrongful birth claims were filed in the 1980s.
See Beasley, supra note 7, at 241 n.62.
56 See Beasley, supra note 7, at 233, 244.
57 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 846, 879 (1992) (reaffirming Roe's holding, that "the right of a woman to choose to
have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue influence[,]" still stands).
58 Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y.1978).
" See id. at 813.
60 Id. ("Certainly, assuming the validity of plaintiffs' allegations, it can be said in
traditional tort language that but for the defendants' breach of their duty to advise





The court opined that the facts allowed for pecuniary damages, 63 but it
declined to allow recovery for emotional harm for policy reasons.64 This
direct, no-nonsense approach has become the template for all or part of
many states' decisions regarding wrongful birth damages.65
In the United States today, thirty states recognize wrongful birth
actions.66 In addition to Roe having legitimized parents' abortion rights,
advances in medical technology have raised the standard of care
physicians are expected to provide, making wrongful birth claims more
prevalent.67 The technology available to detect the presence of prenatal
birth defects has become highly developed, and the expectation that it be
used and interpreted accurately has increased proportionately. 68
Wrongful birth claims have quickly become a manifestation of many
parents' shock and anger when this expectation is not met.
C. Elements of a Successful Wrongful Birth Claim
Wrongful birth, while "not an ordinary tort,, 69 is also not a new tort
as some courts, including Kentucky's, have claimed.7° Wrongful birth is
merely a different name for a medical malpractice or medical negligence
claim based on a certain set of facts.71 Therefore, "creation" of a
wrongful birth cause of action truly does not require the legislative
mandate that some courts claim is necessary; it only requires application
of old principles to new facts. Thus, wrongful birth claims must satisfy
63 To review the facts of Becker, see supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
64 Id. The court feared that allowing recovery for emotional harm would "inevitably
le[a]d to the drawing of artificial and arbitrary boundaries" between what qualified as
"emotional harm" and what did not. Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 813-14 (citation omitted).
65 See, e.g., Robak v, United States, 658 F.2d 471, 479 (7th Cir. 1981); Moores v.
Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022, 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Greco v. United States, 893
P.2d 345, 351, 353 (Nev. 1995) (also disallowing recovery for emotional pain and
suffering due to policy reasons); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 351 (N.H. 1986). But see
Phillips v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309, 1320 (D.S.C. 1983) (citing Becker, but still
allowing over a million dollars in damages for emotional suffering).
66 Young, supra note 10, at col. 4. While California, New Jersey and Washington
permit both types of claims, 27 other states recognize only wrongful birth claims. Id.
67 Cote, 513 A.2d at 345-46.
68 Id. For example, amniocentesis, which tests fetal cells for various diseases, was an
experimental procedure until it finally became commonplace in the mid-1970s, Id. at
346. At that point, "reproductive counseling" became far more important. Id. at 345.
69 See Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 534 (N.C. 1985).
70 See Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Ctr., 120 S.W.3d 682, 691 (Ky. 2003).
71 See id. at 687 ("From the pleadings, the claims sound in traditional medical




the same elements as other tort actions: duty, breach, causation, and
injury.
2
The doctor owes a duty to his patient (the mother) to inform her fully
about her medical condition or, in this case, her pregnancy.73 This
includes an obligation to inform the patient of all risks and dangers so
she can make intelligent decisions regarding her condition.74 Therefore,
"[a] misdiagnosis or [a] withholding of medical information . . . [can] be
considered a breach of the duty of care" to the mother. 75 This duty,
however, does not extend to the unborn child. It has been held that
doctors do not owe a duty to the child in utero since they are technically
not yet in existence.7 6 It follows that wrongful birth claims concentrate
on the rights of the parent, side-stepping the issue of the child's rights.
In Kentucky, a plaintiff wishing to recover for medical malpractice
"must prove that the treatment given was below the degree of care and
skill expected of a reasonably competent practitioner, and that the
negligence proximately caused injury . . . .,7 In addition, the "bare
possibility" of causation is not enough; there must be a solid link. 78 It is
with the final two elements, causation and injury, that the wrongful birth
debate begins in earnest. The contention surrounding these pivotal
elements is the primary focus of the remaining portions of this note.
III. GRUBBS FROM BEGINNING TO END
A. The Tragic Road to Trial
The events that formed the Grubbs case evolved from two similar
sets of circumstances. In 1992, Gretchen Bogan underwent an ultrasound
72 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 164,165 (5th ed. 1984).
73 61 Am. JuR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons and Other Healers §§ 211-12 (2002).
74 Id.
71 Grubbs, 120 S.W.3d at 688.
76 According to the Grubbs court, the lower court dismissed the wrongful life claims
concluding that "there is no separate, independent duty owed by a physician to an unborn
child apart from the duty owed to the mother." Id. at 687. But this is a major stumbling
block when wrongful life claims are examined under tort principles. For a wrongful life
claim to proceed in this way, the presiding court would have to fmd a duty owed to the
unborn child. See Mark Strasser, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, Wrongful Death, and the
Right to Refuse Treatment: Can Reasonable Jurisdictions Recognize All But One?, 64
Mo. L. REV. 29,44-46 (1999).
77 Reams v. Stutler, 642 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Ky. 1982) (citing Blair v. Eblen, 461




twenty-two weeks into her pregnancy. Her doctor reviewed the test,
informing Mrs. Bogan that everything was normal.7 9 Several months
later, in March 1993, Nathan Bogan was born prematurely with severe
birth defects8 ° that rendered him unable to "do anything but exist."81
Similarly, in 1995, Kimberly Grubbs was informed after an initial
ultrasound that her pregnancy "was progressing normally,"82 but two
months later a second ultrasound revealed that her daughter, Carlei,
would be born with spina bifida and hydrocephalus. 3 By the time the
defect was detected, it was far too late to consider terminating the
pregnancy. As a result of the doctors' alleged negligence and the
resulting impaired children, the Grubbses and the Bogans asserted
wrongful life claims on behalf of their children and wrongful birth claims
of their own.84
In both trial courts, the wrongful life claims were dismissed. 85 The
Grubbses' wrongful birth claim was allowed "to the full extent of
damages," while the Bogans were allowed only damages for Mrs.
Bogan's physical condition due to Nathan's caesarian birth.86
The Kentucky Court of Appeals consolidated the cases to address the
overarching question regarding "whether Kentucky law recognizes...
'birth-related torts.' 87 The answer, like those of other state courts before
it, 88 was not a simple "yes" or "no." Rather, the court adopted a
fragmented response to the issues, making analysis of these claims
difficult.
Because this issue was one of first impression both in the state of
Kentucky and in the Sixth Circuit, the court had little in the way of
immediate guidance. The issue had never been directly addressed by the
9 Grubbs, 120 S.W.3d at 685.
8o See id. As a result of a cyst that enlarged Nathan's head, he was born with "no
eyes and no brain, although he has an underdeveloped brain stem that supports minimal
autonomic functioning. He has a cleft palate and cannot speak. He must be strapped into
a wheelchair to sit, and he has no control of his bowels." Id. at 686.
81 Id. (quoting the Bogans' appellate brief).
82 Id. at 685.
83 Hydrocephalus occurs when fluid builds up on the brain, causing mental
deficiencies. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 687 (2d
ed. 1980). In addition to these conditions, Carlei Grubbs was also born with poor vision,
misshapen kidneys, and is a paraplegic. Grubbs, 120 S.W.3d at 685.
" Grubbs, 120 S.W.2d at 685-86.
85 id.
'6 Id. at 686.
87 Id.
88 See discussion infra Part II.
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Sixth Circuit, 9 and the only relevant precedent Kentucky law had to
offer was Schork v. Huber,90 in which the Supreme Court refused to
recognize wrongful conception, 9' another birth-related tort.92 The Schork
court reasoned that "parents who give birth to a normal healthy child are
not entitled to their costs of raising the child from the physician" based
on his negligence. 93 The Schork court also considered whether creating
this or other birth-related torts (including wrongful birth and wrongful
life) should be left exclusively to the General Assembly, Kentucky's
legislative body.94 However, since the Schork court did not directly
address wrongful birth and wrongful life, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
disregarded its decision and examined the issues in Grubbs according to
traditional negligence principles.9 5 As a result, it held that the children's
suits for wrongful life were not actionable 96 but that the parents' claims
for wrongful birth could potentially satisfy the traditional four-part test
for medical negligence.97 Therefore, "the Court of Appeals remanded the
Bogan case for further proceedings." 98 Both the Grubbs and Bogan
families subsequently appealed this decision to the Kentucky Supreme
Court, which granted discretionary review to the cases. 99
B. The Kentucky Supreme Court: Going Against Accord
In its opinion, the Kentucky Supreme Court admitted that both
families' claims "sound[ed] in traditional medical negligence," and
agreed to analyze the claims under traditional negligence principles from
the outset. I00 The court stated that it was possible to satisfy the duty and
89 See France v. United States, No. 99-1650, 2000 WL 1033020 (6th Cir. July 18,
2000). Plaintiff asserted a wrongful birth claim but the merits were not reached, as the
Sixth Circuit decided the case was properly dismissed in District Court for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Id. at *3.
90 See Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983).
9' Id. at 862.
92 Courts distinguish wrongful conception cases from wrongful birth suits by
"looking at whether the child is healthy but unwanted ... or unhealthy and unwanted."
Beasley, supra note 7, at 233.
93 Schork, 648 S.W.2d at 863 (emphasis added).
94 Id.
95 Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Ctr., 120 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Ky. 2003).
96 Id. at 687 ("[T]here is no separate, independent duty owed by a physician to an
unborn child apart from the duty owed to the mother.").
97 See id. at 686-87. Recall that the Grubbses' claim had been dismissed below due
to the statute of limitations; the court of appeals affirmed this decision.
98 Id. at 687.




breach requirements if the plaintiffs presented "adequate proof."' 0'
However, upon reaching the issue of "consequent injury,"' 0 2 the court
broke away from what has become prevalent in other states. 1°3 For
support in this endeavor, the court looked to a North Carolina case,
Azzolino v. Dingfelder10 4 which also bucked the wrongful birth trend.
1. Azzolino v. Dingfelder: The Court's Crutch
The facts of Azzolino are quite similar to those of Becker, yet the two
courts came to inconsistent conclusions. 0 5 Michael Azzolino was born
with Down's Syndrome, prompting his parents to file suit. ° 6 The
Azzolinos alleged that the defendants "failed to advise [them] properly
and incorrectly advised them with respect to the availability of
amniocentesis and genetic counseling."' 0 7 Like the Beckers, the
Azzolinos claimed that, had they known that Down's Syndrome would
afflict their child, they would have "terminated [the] pregnancy by
abortion."'0 8
The Azzolino court rejected the parents' wrongful birth claim for two
reasons. First, it acknowledged that most jurisdictions allowed claims for
wrongful birth on a negligence theory. 0 9 Nonetheless, even assuming
that duty and breach could be proven, the court was unable to accept that
any real injury had occurred.' 10 The court said that to recognize wrongful
birth in accordance with traditional tort principles:
[C]ourts must . . . take a step into entirely untraditional analysis by
holding that the existence of a human life can constitute an injury
cognizable at law. Far from being 'traditional' tort analysis, such a step
requires a view of human life previously unknown to the law of this
'0' See id. at 688.
1o21d. at 687.
103 Young, supra note 10 (thirty states currently recognize wrongful birth actions in
ton).
104 Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985).
105 Compare id. at 537, with Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813 (N.Y. 1978).
(While the Azzolino court flatly held that "claims for relief for wrongful birth are not
cognizable at law in [its] jurisdiction," the Becker court opined that the parents' wrongful
birth causes of action "do allege ascertainable damages [for] the pecuniary expense" of
raisinan unwanted child.).
Azzolino, 337 S.E.2d at 530.
107 Id. Plaintiffs also alleged claims for wrongful life on Michael's behalf and claims
of emotional hardship/loss of society on behalf of Michael's siblings. Id. at 530-31.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 533.
1 0 Id. at 534.
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jurisdiction. We are unwilling to take any such step because we are
unwilling to say that life, even life with severe defects, may ever
amount to a legal injury.11'
Thus, the Azzolino court framed the injury as the child's life itself. While
this is a widely accepted reason for rejecting wrongful life claims,
Azzolino extended it to justify the rejection of a wrongful birth claim as
well.
The Azzolino court's second reason concerned the issue of
damages. 1 2 The court explained that other jurisdictions had "failed to
establish a clear trend or any real trend at all with regard to the measure
of damages to be allowed."'" 3 The opinion noted that, while the typical
negligence claim makes the guilty defendant liable for all damages
resulting from the injury, courts had been unable to go this far in
assessing wrongful birth damages.'1 4 The court interpreted this
inconsistency as a sign that these claims should not be recognized and
ultimately rejected wrongful birth in its jurisdiction.'1 5
2. Following the Outlier
The Kentucky Supreme Court concurred with Azzolino in every
respect. Its decision mirrored the North Carolina court's in its wrongful-
life-as-wrongful-birth reasoning regarding the existence of an injury,
1 6
and in its approach to damages."
7
Specifically, the Grubbs court noted that the "uncertainty and lack of
uniformity [regarding damages] in jurisdictions recognizing wrongful
birth ... arises from a failure to recognize that the 'injury' they seek to
Ill id. at 533-34 (emphasis in original).
112 See id. at 534-37.
"13 Id. at 534.
114 id.
115 Id. at 537. The Azzolino court cited two other reasons for rejecting the wrongful
birth cause of action: the potential for fraud and the burden on physicians. For discussion
of these lines of reasoning, see id. at 535.
116 See Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Ctr., 120 S.W.3d 682, 689-90 (Ky.
2003) ("We agree with the [Azzolino court's] analysis of the injury element .... [W]e are
unwilling to equate the loss of an abortion opportunity resulting in a genetically or
congenitally impaired human life, even severely impaired, with a cognizable legal
injury.").
17 Id. Similar to the Azzolino opinion, the Grubbs court was skeptical about the
proper damage award, noting that "the limits of this new liability . . . can only be
confined by drawing arbitrary and artificial boundaries which a majority of the court
considers popular and desirable." Id.
2004-2005]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
compensate is not an injury" at all. " 8 According to the court's reasoning,
one cannot have an injury for which abortion and non-existence is the
antidote because it violates the sanctity-of-life notion and does not fit
within the traditional tort framework." 9 Consequently, those courts that
award anything less than full childrearing damages are not applying tort
principles correctly because they do not award damages for "all the
reasonably foreseeable results of [the physicians'] negligence."' 
20
Apparently, the Grubbs court believed that if these other courts could not
fully justify awarding an enormous and unnecessary amount, 12 they
should have refrained from doing so altogether. 
122
Finally, the justices of the Grubbs majority worried that recognizing
a cause of action for wrongful birth would beg the question: which
"negligently undiagnosed" birth defects would warrant recovery?123 They
feared that parents would begin to sue for even the smallest "defect,"
from having a child not of the desired gender to actual diseases and
deformities, thus "slid[ing] quickly into applied eugenics."'' 24 Bolstered
by this additional concern, the court elected not to allow a cause of action
for wrongful birth in Kentucky.
25
Regarding the Bogans' claim alone, 126 the court allowed a breach of
contract action to continue, explaining that "we do not believe physicians
should be relieved of any proven contractual responsibility to report to
patients the accurate results of diagnostic procedures, even if the
condition is 'incurable."", 127 The court also allowed the Bogans' one
remaining claim, for pain and suffering connected to Gretchen Bogan's
caesarean delivery, to proceed to trial. 128 Even if this claim is successful,
it will only provide recovery for items directly related to the birth.129 It
" Id. at 690.
" 9 Id. at 689.
120 Id. at 690 (emphasis added).
121 As explained later in this note, full childrearing damages are not the appropriate
"reasonably foreseeable" remedy for a wrongful birth action. See discussion infra Part
IV.B.
122 Grubbs, 120 S.W.3d at 690. The court opined that the legislature was best able to
handle this potentially new cause of action, stating that "these cases pose a problem
which can only be properly resolved by a legislative body, and not by courts of law." Id.
"'3/d. at 690-91.
124 id.
121 Id. at 691.
126 The court upheld the Knox Circuit Court's dismissal of the Grubbses' claim for
statute-of-limitations reasons. Id.







will not compensate for the multitude of expenses and suffering that are
involved in trying to care for Nathan the rest of his life. Thus, while
entirely shutting the door on birth-related tort recovery, the Kentucky
Supreme Court left a narrow crack through which plaintiffs could receive
some small measure of reparation. However, this opening is too small to
provide the adequate compensation that the Bogans and other such
plaintiffs deserve.
IV. FLAWED FRAMING AND DAMAGES
The Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Grubbs, while
reasonable, goes against the common opinion and logic of most courts
across the country that have rendered opinions on the issue of wrongful
birth. 130 The court could have provided relief for parents who have
suffered as a result of prenatal negligence, but a variety of interpretive
mistakes were made along the way which effectively precluded any
substantial recovery.
Two errors in particular led the court in the wrong direction. First,
the court, by following Azzolino, did not frame the injury issue correctly,
going against the solid foundations that have been laid in this area over
the last twenty-five years. 3 ' Second, it made the molehill of calculating
damages seem like a mountain. As a result, the Kentucky Supreme
Court's decision "will prevent future parents in this position from
recovering any tort damages for their physicians' negligence."'
' 32
A. Misframing the Injury Issue
The Kentucky Supreme Court erred when it relied heavily on
Azzolino by adopting its reasoning against wrongful life to justify a
condemnation of wrongful birth. 133 Other jurisdictions have found this
reasoning erroneous. 34 Wrongful life and wrongful birth are two
130 See discussion supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
131 See discussion, infra Part IV.A, that explores many courts' decisions subsequent
to Roe v. Wade and its progeny. Those courts framed the wrongful birth issue in terms of
medical negligence. In particular, they framed the injury issue as one of a loss of the
choice to abort a defective fetus, rather than treating life itself as the injury.
112 See Grubbs, 120 S.W.3d at 697 (Keller, J., dissenting).
133 See discussion supra Part III.B.
134 Courts that have upheld a cause of action for wrongful birth did not hold that life
itself was a cognizable injury. See, e.g., Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1206
(Colo. 1988) ("[W]e need not find that 'life, even life with severe defects,' constitutes a
legal injury in order to recognize [wrongful birth as a cause of action]."); Smith v. Cote,
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different torts; the rationale criticizing one will not suffice to condemn
the other. 35 The Grubbs majority indicated that it was "unwilling" to
treat a life as an injury 36 and that the physician "cannot be said to have
caused the [child's] defect[s].', 137 This is, of course, a perfectly valid
conviction, but it is possible for the court to remain true to this principle
while still providing a cause of action and appropriate relief for the
suffering plaintiffs. While wrongful birth claims are admittedly a delicate
subject, these claims need not focus upon the impossible dilemma of
whether life is an injury. As Justice Keller noted in his dissent in Grubbs,
"we need not find that 'life, even life with severe defects,' constitutes a
legal injury in order to recognize the... claim for relief.'
138
The key to recognition of this claim lies in another controversial
decision: Roe v. Wade.139 According to Roe, a woman has a right to
terminate her pregnancy prior to viability for any reason she might
choose or for no reason at all. 140 Doctors cannot hinder this process, but
they must provide information that allows the woman to make an
informed choice. 141 Failure to do so can rob the woman or the parents of
information crucial to such a decision.
142
While it has polarized the nation, Roe remains the law of the land; a
woman's right to an informed choice to terminate her pregnancy is
constitutionally protected. 43 As a decision by our nation's highest court,
lower federal and state courts alike must abide by this decision to protect
the right to an abortion, even when they find it repugnant.' 44 This right
513 A.2d 341, 348 (N.H. 1986) (holding that the court did not have to reach the issue of
whether life itself can constitute a legal injury while recognizing wrongful birth causes of
action).
135 See discussion supra Part II.A-B.
136 See Grubbs, 120 S.W.3d at 689.
137 Id. (quoting Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 816 (N.Y. 1978) (Wachtler, J.,
dissenting)).
138 Id. at 695 (Keller, J., dissenting) (quoting Lininger, 764 P.2d at 1206).
139 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
140 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
141 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881-84 (1992); 61 AM. JUR. 2D
Physicians, Surgeons and Other Healers §§ 211-12 (2002).
142 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882-84.
143 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (noting that the right to abortion is part of the greater right
to privacy implicit in the Constitution).
144 See Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 538 (N.C. 1985) (Exum, J.,
dissenting) ("Although I might personally believe that life in any condition is always
preferable to nonexistence, I am not willing to accept the majority's stance that this




frames the injury of which parents complain in a wrongful birth claim. It
is not the life, but the loss of a choice, that constitutes the injury. 145
If the argument is framed in this manner, the concept of life as an
injury becomes irrelevant. 46 The denial of the parents' right to an
informed abortion decision becomes the central issue. The court need not
address the issue of life as an injury, the non-existence paradox, nor the
question of what defects in the child the physician may actually have
caused. The cause of action rests safely "within the confines of common
law negligence,' 47 where it should have been from the outset.
From this point of view, it is straightforward to reach the conclusion
that wrongful birth is a cognizable injury, and to award damages for that
injury. The Supreme Court of Colorado, directly disagreeing with
Azzolino, came to just such a conclusion in Lininger v. Eisenbaum, which
provides a good illustration of the proper formulation of the wrongful
birth issue, carried to its logical conclusion.
14
1. The Correct Solution: Lininger v. Eisenbaum
The facts of Lininger are somewhat different than those of other
wrongful birth cases, but the differences are not substantial enough to
distinguish it. Stephen Lininger was born with an optical problem that
rendered him virtually blind. 49 His parents, concerned that his blindness
might be the result of heredity or a genetic defect, did not want to have
another child without a physician's assurance that a second child would
be likely to have normal sight.' 50 The Lininger's physicians informed
141 See, e.g., id. at 538 (Exum, J., dissenting) (holding that the plaintiffs were injured
"when they were deprived of information they needed to make an informed choice
whether to allow their children to come to term"); see also Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341,
344 (N.H. 1986) (in recognizing wrongful birth causes of action, the court framed the
plaintiffs injury as the preclusion of an informed decision as to whether to have the
child); Canesi v. Wilson, 730 A.2d 805, 818 (N.J. 1999) (holding that the injury plaintiffs
sustained was the loss of the "option to terminate the pregnancy," which was the "widely
accepted [standard] in jurisdictions recognizing wrongful birth actions").
146 See Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Ctr., 120 S.W.3d 682, 696 (Ky. 2003)
(Keller, J., dissenting).
147 Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1208 (Colo. 1988).
148 See generally id. The Lininger court ultimately held that it would recognize
wrongful birth as a cause of action. In refuting Azzolino, the Lininger court stated that
"contrary to Azzolino's suggestion, we need not find that 'life, even life with severe
defects,' constitutes a legal injury in order to recognize the Liningers' claim for relief"
ld. at 1206.




them that Stephen's blindness was not hereditary, so they chose to have
another child.'' However, when their second son, Pierce, was born, he
too was blind. 52 Thereafter, "both children were subsequently diagnosed
with... [a] hereditary form of blindness."'
' 53
The Liningers filed a wrongful birth/wrongful life suit, alleging that
the defendant physicians were negligent for not only failing initially to
diagnose Stephen's blindness correctly when they examined him, but
also for "communicating the misdiagnosis . . . and finally, in advising
them that Stephen's affliction was not hereditary."' 54 But for this
negligence, the Liningers alleged that they would have either avoided
conception of a second child or terminated the pregnancy. 55 They sought
compensation for past and future medical expenses for Pierce, special
education equipment for the blind, lost wages, and emotional distress.
1 56
The court analyzed the Liningers' claim in terms of medical
negligence. 5 7 Like other courts before it, this court established duty,
breach and causation without difficulty.""8 On the issue of injury, the
defendant physicians urged the court to follow Azzolino. 5 9 The court was
not persuaded by the doctors' arguments, likening the situation to a
personal injury claim instead of framing the injury as life itself:
The Liningers allege, at a minimum, that but for the defendants'
negligence they would not be burdened by extraordinary medical and
education expenses associated with the treatment of Pierce's blindness.
That monetary burden is no different from medical or rehabilitation
expenses associated with any personal injury and, contrary to
Azzolino's suggestion, we need not find that 'life, even life with severe
defects' constitutes a legal injury in order to recognize the Liningers'
claim for relief.... We conclude, therefore, that the Liningers may
... Id. at 1203-04.
1121d. at 1204.
' Id. at 1204. Stephen and Pierce were diagnosed with Leber's congenital
amaurosis, a hereditary form of blindness. Since Stephen was born with the disease, the




156 Id. at 1205-06. Notice that the Liningers did not make these claims regarding
Stephen; they are not claiming that his birth and his blindness are the result of physicians'
negligence. He was born with that condition by accident. In contrast, the Liningers would
never have become pregnant with Pierce absent the negligent assurances of their doctors
that he would not suffer his brother's fate.







prove and recover those extraordinary medical and education expenses
occasioned by Pierce's blindness.16
0
With this declaration, the Lininger court properly removed the emotional
issues and focused on what really matters: that parents who relied on
their physician's negligent conduct now must shoulder enormous
financial burdens to provide their impaired child with the appropriate
medical care, and that these burdens should be appropriately
compensated.
2. One Step at a Time: Correctly Navigating Tort Principles
Plaintiffs can easily prove that a doctor-patient relationship existed
between the mother and the physician overseeing her prenatal care, thus
effectively establishing the first element of a cause of action in tort: a
duty of care. Specifically, Roe requires that physicians "ensure [the
mother] ha[s] an opportunity to make an informed decision regarding the
procreative options available to her.' 16 ' To establish the second element,
breach of a duty, a plaintiff must show that the physician did not fulfill
this obligation by failing to diagnose or to inform the plaintiff fully of
her options, thus violating the standard of care.'62
The third element, causation, "is only slightly more troublesome.'
' 63
It must be found that the plaintiff would have terminated her pregnancy
if she had the information of which she was deprived. 164 Thus, this
element considers what might have or should have been but for the
defendant's breach (if the mother had received the correct information to
inform her decision), rather than what actually did happen (she did not
receive the information and thus did not have the benefit of that
knowledge when making the decision to carry the child to term). This
element is not insurmountable: "[tihis circumstance .. .does not entail
160 Id. at 1206-07 (quoting Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 532 (N.C.
1985)). A brief discussion of the "benefit rule" is omitted from this quotation. The
defense contended that "the benefits the Liningers derived from having a second child
cannot be measured in any rational way against the injuries they claim to have suffered"
and that consequently they should not be allowed to recover any damages. The court,
however, believed that the financial burden the Liningers were forced to shoulder
because of the defendants' negligence was "sufficiently unrelated to the pleasure they
will derive from raising Pierce as to preclude operation of the benefit rule." Id. at 1206-
07.
161 Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 346 (N.H. 1986).
162 See 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons and Other Healers § § 211-12 (2002).
'63 Cote, 513 A.2d at 347.
164 see id. ,
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inability to establish such proof; it is present in every informed consent
case involving a subjective standard of causation. ,1 65 That is, courts must
look at the hypothetical "what if?" in addition to the actual outcome to
determine its cause. Therefore, plaintiffs meet their burden of proof if
"[they] show that, but for the defendants' negligent failure to inform
[them] of the risks of bearing a child with birth defects, [they] would
have obtained an abortion.
'' 66
While proving the causation element is rather subjective,
167
subjectivity alone is not enough to preclude a cause of action. Further,
many courts have simply assumed arguendo that the physicians'
misdiagnosis or failure to inform is the proximate cause of the parents'
loss of their abortion decision, 68 enabling them to reach the damages
issue more readily.
The fourth and final requirement, injury, has been redefined in more
useful terms: the loss of the ability to make an informed decision
regarding whether to parent an impaired child, and bearing a child
without benefit of that choice. 169 This solution deftly sidesteps the life
and abortion issues altogether and allows the court to award relief based
on a pragmatically defined concept of injury.
This analysis, which the Grubbs court chose to reject, is not a
difficult one and could easily have been satisfied had the plaintiffs' cases
been allowed to proceed to trial.' 70 It cannot be said that, as a matter of
law, there was no injury to the parents or that breach or causation could





168 See, e.g., Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1205 (Colo. 1988) (finding,
with no disagreement from the parties, that "the defendants' purported negligence
proximately caused the birth of Pierce since the Liningers would not have conceived a
second child (or would have terminated the pregnancy) had they accurately been apprised
of the possibility that a second child would suffer the same affliction"); Cote, 513 A.2d at
347 ("No logical obstacle precludes proof of causation.... Such proof is furnished if the
plaintiffs] can show that, but for the defendants' negligent failure to inform [them] of the
risks of bearing a child with birth defects, [they] would have obtained an abortion.");
Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 533 (N.C. 1985) ("We also assume arguendo
* . . that the birth of Michael Azzolino [because of his parents' loss of choice] was the
proximate result of the defendants' negligence.").
169 See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
170 Both plaintiffs sufficiently stated in their complaint that the defendant doctors'
negligence caused the parents to lose an opportunity to abort their defective fetuses. See
Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Ctr., 120 S.W.3d 682, 685-86 (Ky. 2003).
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B. Damages Are Not a Stumbling Block
It is not as difficult to quantify damages for wrongful birth as the
Grubbs court suggests. Even if it were, such a claim is valid, as "mere
difficulty in the ascertainment of damages" would be insufficient to
preclude the action.1 71 It has already become clear that wrongful birth is
easily recognizable as a valid cause of action.1 7 2 Thus the only remaining
issue, that of damages, poses no real obstacle.
First, consider the difference between damages for a lost choice and
damages for the unwanted life of a child. Comparing the costs of raising
an impaired child with those of raising a healthy child is far simpler than
comparing them with the prospect of a child's total nonexistence. This
very problem was addressed by the Supreme Court of Texas in Jacobs v.
Thiemer: 
73
The objection is to an award based upon speculation as to the quality of
life [of the child] and as to the pluses and minuses of parental mind and
emotion.
The economic burden ... is a different matter which is free from
the above objection. These expenses lie within the methods of proof by
which the courts are accustomed to determine awards in personal injury
cases. No public policy obstacle should be interposed to that
174
recovery.
Thus, removal of the philosophical and emotional issues significantly
reduces the challenge of determining damages.
According to traditional tort principles, tort defendants are liable for
all "reasonably foreseeable results of their negligence."1 75 This suggests
that physicians, if liable, must pay all expenses related to raising the
impaired child resulting from the physician's negligence. However, "few
if any jurisdictions appear ready to apply this traditional rule of damages
171 Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 550 (D.S.C. 1981); see also Mark
Strasser, Misconceptions and Wrongful Births: A Call for a Principled Jurisprudence, 31
ARiz. ST. L.J. 161,185 (1999).
172 See supra notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
173 Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975). The facts of Jacobs are very
similar to those of Gleitman, and in fact Gleitman was cited for that reason in Jacobs. Id.
at 849.
174 Id.
175 Grubbs, 120 S.W.3d at 690.
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with full vigor in wrongful birth cases. 176 In fact, only one has actually
done SO. 177 Instead, lesser awards, such as for "extraordinary costs" or for
medical expenses, have been made in varying amounts. 78 This departure
from the traditional outcome, and the further lack of consensus as to how
damages should be quantified, was entirely unacceptable to the Kentucky
Supreme Court.
179
However, there need not be a general consensus among other
jurisdictions to "evaluate the compensation due to an injured Kentucky
plaintiff.' 180 Furthermore, contrary to the court's observation, there are
consistencies among other jurisdictions. While most courts have allowed
recovery for the extraordinary medical, educational, and special
treatment expenses that stem directly from the child's physical
impairment or disability, 181 many have not allowed recovery solely for
parents' emotional suffering. 82 Several justifications support this
cautious approach. Removing the emotional and ideological elements
from the balance results in calculation of costs based solely on the child's
176 Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 348 (N.H. 1986) (quoting Azzolino v. Dingfelder,
337 S.E.2d 528, 534 (N.C. 1985)).177 See Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 478 (7th Cir. 1981). The Robak court
allowed damages as follows:
the cost of residential education and care to age 21 ... ; the cost of a qualified
companion, skilled in sign language and experienced in dealing with
emotionally disturbed persons, for the remainder of [the child's] adult life, or
comparable institutional care... ; and the cost of maintaining her for her adult
life, since she will never be self-supporting.
Id. at 478.
178 For examples of "lesser" awards that do not go the full tort damages distance, see
cases cited infra notes 181-82. For an explanation of why this is a prudent approach, see
infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
179 See Grubbs, 120 S.W.3d at 690-91.
180 Id. at 697 (Keller, J., dissenting).
181 See Core, 513 A.2d at 349 ("A special rule of damages has emerged; in most
jurisdictions the parents may recover only the extraordinary... costs attributable to the
birth defects.") (citing James v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 882 (W. Va. 1985)); see also
Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1206-07 (Colo. 1988); Siemieniec v. Lutheran
Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 706-07 (I11. 1987); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 11
(Mass. 1990); Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 353 (Nev. 1995). The Cote court
clarified that allowable extraordinary costs can include parental emotional suffering or
distress, but there is a caveat: it must have resulted in tangible pecuniary losses, such as
medical expenses or counseling fees. Cote 513 A.2d at 350. Otherwise, intangible
emotional suffering is often precluded as a measure of damages; see note 182 and
accompanying text.
18' See Siemieniec, 512 N.E. at 707; Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y.




disabilities. Far from being arbitrary and artificial, such a boundary limits
recovery somewhat, so that physicians are not unjustly penalized.
Awarding only extraordinary costs is "neither illogical nor
unprecedented." '183 While damages typically aim to place plaintiffs in the
position they would have been in had the wrong never occurred, the goal
of wrongful birth is slightly different. Wrongful birth plaintiffs typically
want a child and are prepared to shoulder the costs of raising one. But
when this goal is "frustrated by the defendant's negligence, the
extraordinary costs rule 'merely attempts to put the plaintiffs in the
position they expected to be in."",184 Under this rule, awarding the costs of
raising an ordinary, healthy child would result in a "windfall" to the
plaintiffs, who were prepared to spend those amounts anyway.1
85
Awarding the extraordinary costs of raising an impaired child puts the
parents in the same financial position they expected to occupy after the
birth of a healthy child. 18 6 This is the proper operation of the law.
The Bogans sought compensation for pain, suffering and permanent
scarring resulting from Nathan's caesarean birth, present and future
medical expenses for his continuous care, emotional suffering, and lost
wages resulting from the fact that one or both of the Bogans must remain
at home to care for Nathan. 187 There is no reason why they should not
recover most of these damages. Recovery for pain and suffering is
permissible under current Kentucky precedent as long as the injuries
from which they stem were directly related to the birth; likewise, it can
be argued that some amount of lost wages are also a direct result of the
pregnancy and birth. 188 Present and future medical expenses should be
elementary if calculated under the extraordinary costs rule. Thus, the
only compensation the Bogans would not receive is that for their own
emotional suffering.
It is absurd to refuse to recognize a cause of action in part because
damages may require extra effort to measure. That consideration should
be left to a trial jury; it should not be forgotten that this body is
continually trusted to decide many types of cases, some involving
injuries far more quantitatively complex than this. Following those
decisions they award damages, which often involve painstaking
183 Cote, 513 A.2d at 349.
184 Id. (emphasis added in original).
185 See Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 539 (N.C. 1985) (Exum, J.,
dissenting).
186 See id
187 See Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Ctr., 120 S.W.3d 682, 697 (Ky. 2003).




calculations. How can the court say that a wrongful birth claim would be
too difficult?
V. CONCLUSION
The bottom line is- simple: the Kentucky Supreme Court decided
Grubbs incorrectly. While the court relied on respected authority to
guide its decision, there is a very good reason why its opinion is in the
minority. Technology and genetic testing create an expectation of
avoidance of birth defects or certainly of the right to make an informed
decision Whether to continue the pregnancy if defects are detected. It is
imperative that there be adequate recourse for plaintiffs who, through a
physician's negligence, did not receive the benefits that this technology
promises..
Parents who have been denied their rights at the hands of a negligent
physician should have better recourse than a mere contract claim and
recovery for pain in childbearing. The Kentucky plaintiffs in Grubbs did
nothing more than conceive a child and look to their physicians for
adequate prenatal care. However, because of the physicians' negligence,
the parents must care for a child who is severely impaired and were
robbed of the choice to avoid the situation. Yet, as a result of Grubbs, the
negligent physicians will lose little as a result of their carelessness. This
is not justice. Justice Reavley of the Supreme Court of Texas summed up
this argument in Jacobs:
It is impossible for us to justify a policy which at once deprives the
parents of information by which they could elect to terminate the
pregnancy likely to produce a child with a defective body, a policy
which in effect requires that the deficient embryo be carried to full
gestation until the deficient child is born, and which policy then denies
recovery from the tort-feasor of costs of treating and caring for the
defects of the child,' 89
Rather than preventing the wrongful birth claim at the outset, the issues
of whether an injury has occurred and, if so, what damages are
appropriate, should be placed in the hands of a jury. Although these are
difficult issues, the jury system must be trusted to produce the right
result.
189 Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975).
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